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Understanding Risk 
Management in Emerging 
Retail Payments
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n  
lectronic checks, cell phones, and speed-through lanes 
 at toll booths are just a few examples of new payment 
methods recently introduced to the market. Based on 
computer technology, online commerce, and telecom-
munications, these new payment methods rely on electronics 
for most or all of their functions. Many products based on  
these methods have failed, some have struggled to grow, and a 
few have become well accepted in routine commerce. All face 
a variety of risks.
Reflecting these risks, news reports of data breaches, identity 
theft, and fraud have become a part of the electronic payment 
landscape. Novel characteristics associated with “emerging” 
payments include low-cost ways to store and transmit data. 
These technologies can reduce risk, but they can also lead to 
new risks. It is timely now to develop a structure and 
vocabulary for examining how new payment technologies 
affect risk, particularly as the number of ways to make noncash 
payments grows and as payments shift from paper-based to 
electronic form.1
Understanding the structure of risk is useful, although 
assessing losses and mitigation efforts in a new payment 
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• The retail payment landscape is shifting 
increasingly from paper to electronic form 
as the number of ways to make noncash 
payments grows.
￿ Payment products, services, rules, and 
technologies are changing at a rapid rate—
as are the tools for perpetrating fraud, illicit 
use, and breaches of data security.
￿ Providers of emerging payment methods now 
face the same risks as providers of more 
established methods; failure to control these 
risks can lead to rejection in the market. 
￿ By limiting access to payment networks, 
monitoring for compliance with risk mitigation 
standards, and enforcing penalties for 
noncompliance, emerging as well as 
established providers can contain many of 
the risks associated with fraud, illicit use, 
and data security breaches.
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product can be difficult. Low levels of fraud losses, for example, 
could imply that: 1) risk is low, 2) current mitigation practices 
are effective, or 3) weaknesses have not yet been discovered. 
However, high levels of losses demonstrate that risks are high, 
and it takes time to know whether mitigation efforts can 
succeed. In either case, only time and the monitoring of 
problems will reveal whether risk can be controlled sufficiently. 
In this article, we consider whether, in this period of 
uncertainty, the sponsor of an emerging payment method has 
enough incentives and tools to control risk before the harm 
from fraud or operational problems becomes widespread.1 
Our analysis suggests that the sponsors and providers of 
successful emerging payment methods must be aware of 
potential fraud risk and operational risk. Moreover, they must 
mitigate these risks or face rejection in the payment market. 
Service providers can contain risks by limiting access to their 
payment networks, monitoring for compliance with risk 
mitigation standards, and enforcing penalties for 
noncompliance. While much of this containment activity is 
voluntary, some is enforced by public authorities that can help 
coordinate activities as well as define and enforce standards.
This article explores in several ways the structure and 
vocabulary of emerging payments system risks and their 
mitigation. We begin by recounting several incidents of fraud 
and losses associated with emerging payment methods. We 
then describe an economic framework for understanding risk 
control in retail payments. Next, we apply the framework to the 
risk experiences of three new payment types. These 
approaches—both deductive and inductive—are 
complementary ways to understand risk and its mitigation in 
emerging payment methods. Finally, we discuss some general 
observations derived from integrating the economic concepts 
and actual experiences, then offer conclusions. 
1 In 2003, the number of electronic payments exceeded the number of check 
payments for the first time. See Federal Reserve System (2004).
2. True Accounts of Fraud and 
Operational Risks in Payment 
Innovations
The following accounts illustrate fraud and operational 
problems that exploited the novel characteristics of new 
payment methods. These incidents include a telemarketing 
scheme, a complex online fraud, and two data security 
breaches. The crimes that underlie these incidents—fraud, 
con artistry, and theft of money, property, or someone’s good 
name—are not themselves new.  The operational problems are 
also not necessarily new, but the potential scale and speed of 
the disruptions are of a magnitude untypical of their paper-
based counterparts. 
2.1 Telemarketing Fraud 
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that 
it had closed down the Assail Telemarketing Network and its 
affiliates. The FTC alleged that the Assail companies ran 
telemarketing activities from so-called boiler-room operations 
that offered credit cards to consumers with poor credit 
records.2 Under the guise of charging membership fees, these 
firms persuaded consumers to provide the bank and account 
information from their checks.3 The telemarketers then used 
this information to create electronic debits to consumers’ 
checking accounts as payment for the  “membership” fees. 
These credit cards appear to have been rarely, if ever, delivered. 
The consumers found, however, that they had also been signed 
up for expensive and dubious products (so-called upsell 
programs) such as auto club memberships, the fees for which 
were directly charged to their bank accounts. When consumers 
called to complain, the companies used elaborate scripts to 
avoid repayment or cancellation of the membership. The FTC 
alleged that Assail and its principals engaged in deceptive 
marketing activities that totaled more than $100 million.4 
The particular type of electronic transaction that Assail 
used, a debit through the automated clearinghouse (ACH), 
must be processed, collected, and paid through participating 
banks. These banks are supposed to monitor the companies for 
2 See Federal Trade Commission, “International Telemarketing Network 
Defendants Banned from Telemarketing,” press release, January 24, 2005, 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/01/assail.htm>, as well as other 
FTC press releases. 
3 Consumers provided the encoded information that runs across the lower edge 
of a check, which is also known as magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) 
information. 
4 ConsumerAffairs.com, “Bogus Credit Card Marketers Settle Federal Charges,” 
January 26, 2005.
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which they provide this ACH origination service. In this case, 
First Premier Bank admitted that it had failed to perform due 
diligence on the activities and legitimacy of its customers, but 
it then helped identify the telemarketers and supplied 
information to the investigative agencies. The bank later paid 
$200,000 to Iowa, South Dakota, and Minnesota as part of a 
wider settlement and agreed to engage vigorously in know-
your-customer practices and ongoing monitoring of customer 
activity.5 
Before the particular ACH transaction type used by Assail 
was introduced, this type of fraud was often perpetrated by 
creating a “remotely created check”—a check that contains a 
text legend in lieu of the payer’s signature. This approach is still 
used to commit fraud, but it does not offer the speed and scale 
this fraudster achieved using automation.6
2.2 Transaction Fraud and Data Security 
Breach
The U.S. Department of Justice reported that, in 2000, two 
Russian men, Vasiliy Gorshkov and Alexey Ivanov, used 
unauthorized access to Internet service providers in the United 
States to misappropriate credit card, bank account, and other 
personal financial information from more than 50,000 
individuals.7 They allegedly hijacked computer networks and 
then used the compromised processors to commit fraud 
through PayPal and the online auction company eBay. 
According to the Justice Department’s press releases, the 
fraudsters developed elaborate programs to establish 
thousands of anonymous e-mail accounts at websites that, at 
the time, did not have the sophisticated tools required to 
distinguish human intervention at set-up. Gorshkov’s 
programs created accounts at PayPal that were based on 
random identities and stolen credit card numbers. The 
programs then transferred funds from one account to another 
to generate cash and to pay for computer parts purchased from 
vendors in the United States. Additional computer programs 
allowed the conspirators to control and manipulate eBay 
auctions so that they could act as both seller and winning 
bidder in the same auction and then effectively pay themselves 
using the stolen credit cards.8
5 This was the first time that the Federal Trade Commission tried to hold a bank 
responsible for the deceptive practices of its customer.
6 To help reduce the potential for fraud in the use of remotely created checks, 
the Federal Reserve Board amended its Regulation CC effective on July 1, 2006, 
to create transfer and presentment warranties under which any bank that 
transfers or presents a remotely created check warrants that the check is 
authorized by the person on whose account the check is drawn. See Federal 
Reserve Board press release, November 21, 2005, available at <http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20051121/>.
7 U.S. Department of Justice, “Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced to Three 
Years in Prison,” press release, October 4, 2002.
This was a case of fraudsters hacking into databases, stealing 
payment-related and other information, using the stolen 
identities to create fictitious accounts, manipulating online 
auctions, and using machine-based tools to proliferate their 
thefts and confound the transaction/audit trail. 
Ultimately, the FBI used an undercover operation to lure the 
two hackers to Seattle, Washington, where they had been 
invited under the pretext of a job interview with “Invita,” a 
fictitious computer security company. In October 2002, the 
two men were sentenced to three years in prison. 
2.3 Unsecure Data
In 2005, the president and chief executive officer of 
CardSystems Solutions, Inc., a transaction processor, testified 
before a Congressional committee that, in September 2004, 
an unauthorized party had placed a clandestine computer 
program on the company’s transaction processing system 
(Perry 2005). CardSystems reported that, on May 22, 2005, it 
suffered a “potential security incident.” Records on 263,000 
transactions were stolen—including account holders’ names, 
account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes. Forty 
million records were potentially at risk. 
CardSystems disclosed the breach to its bank as well as to 
MasterCard, Visa, and American Express. The three credit card 
companies determined that CardSystems had violated the 
credit card industry’s prevailing security and data retention 
standards. Visa and American Express announced that they 
would not permit the firm to process their transactions after 
October 31, 2005. On October 15, Pay by Touch announced its 
acquisition of CardSystems Solutions because of the latter’s 
network connections to 120,000 merchants, despite the demise 
of its card transaction processing business.9
More recently, in early 2007, the TJX Companies, which 
operate retail stores in the United States, Canada, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom, reported that data security breaches from 
mid-2005 until late 2006 might have compromised more than 
45 million customer records.10 Company investigations also 
revealed breaches in 2003 and 2004, as well as compromised 
driver’s license numbers and addresses. The Massachusetts 
Bankers Association reported fraudulent use of debit and credit 
cards issued by its members as a result of that breach. The 
8 Physor.com describes some of the techniques used by criminals to perpetrate 
fraud through online auction sites. See <http://www.physorg.com/
news84545784.html>, December 5, 2006.
9 Pay by Touch, “Pay by Touch to Acquire CardSystems Solutions, A Leading 
Provider of Integrated Payment Solutions,” press release, October 15, 2005. 
10 TJX Companies, Inc., “The TJX Companies, Inc. Victimized by Computer 
Systems Intrusion; Provides Information to Help Protect Customers,” press 
release, January 17, 2007, available at <http://home.businesswire.com/portal/
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Association’s press releases recounted that fraudulent card data 
had been used to make purchases in many U.S. states, Hong 
Kong, Sweden, and other countries.11 
The Wall Street Journal reported that hackers first tapped 
into data transmissions from handheld equipment used 
to manage store inventory and prices.12 Reportedly, they 
used these captured data to crack encryption codes and to 
steal employees’ user names and passwords at company 
headquarters. With the resulting access to TJX’s network, 
they stole credit and debit card numbers and even left messages 
for each other. Stolen card numbers were then allegedly sold on 
the Internet. Press reports traced losses to banks across the 
country. In addition to direct purchases with stolen credit 
and debit card numbers, the thieves or their customers also 
purchased prepaid cards, which were in turn used to purchase 
goods and services. 
3. Definitions and Economic Insights
The examples just offered illustrate some risks of financial loss 
that are present in payment methods. We now turn to an 
economic examination of these risks and their mitigation, 
beginning with three general observations. First, the risks 
present when new or still-emerging payment methods are used 
are not wholly different from those present in long-established 
methods of payment. Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that 
certain risks are more salient in emerging retail payments than 
elsewhere in the payment marketplace.
Second, new payment methods are generally based on, or 
emerge from, existing payment products. To focus this 
discussion, we define established payments to include paper 
checks, recurring transactions transferred through the ACH, 
credit card and debit card transactions made with magnetic-
stripe cards, and wire transfers. To this base, enhancements, 
innovations, and rules are added to address newly identified 
market opportunities or to take advantage of expanding 
technical capabilities. Sometimes innovations are sufficient to 
yield a distinguishably new payment method. Thus, we define 
emerging retail payments as those newly introduced payment 
11 Massachusetts Bankers Association, “Massachusetts Banks Now Reporting 
That Fraud Has Occurred Due to the TJX Data Breach,” press release, January 24, 
2007, available at <http://www.massbankers.org/pdfs/TJXfraudNR.pdf>. 
Also see “Massachusetts, Connecticut Bankers Associations and the Maine 
Association of Community Banks and Individual Banks File Class Action 
Lawsuit Against TJX Companies Inc.,” press release, April 24, 2007. 
12 Joseph Pereira, “Breaking the Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out 
Wireless Door: Biggest Known Theft Came from Retailer with Old, Weak 
Security,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2007.
methods that differ from established payments in a significant 
way—that is, technologically, contractually, legally, or 
conceptually. 
Third, every payment method involves risk. The Bank for 
International Settlements’ Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems identifies five major categories of risk 
associated with payment transactions: fraud, operational, legal, 
settlement, and systemic.13 Generally, other types of risk are 
subcategories of these five broad types. Emerging payment 
methods may be particularly susceptible to fraud and 
operational risks. They may also carry enhanced legal risk 
simply because case law is less well developed or because the 
drafters of established laws and regulations may not have 
foreseen some of the ways in which payments are initiated, 
processed, and settled. Definitions of the three risks mainly 
associated with emerging payments are presented in the box.
A payment method may also carry risks not directly 
associated with the success or failure to transfer value. Instead, 
indirect problems may arise that appear ancillary to the 
financial transaction. For emerging retail payment methods, 
two risks of this type are notable: data security risk and risk of 
illicit use. In these cases, the payment methods function and 
transfer value correctly, but something underlying the 
transaction is “bad.” 
Data security risk is a form of operational risk involving 
unauthorized modification, destruction, or disclosure of data 
used in or to support transactions. For example, a data security 
breach may facilitate identity theft, which could trigger later 
harm to a party in a transaction or an otherwise uninvolved 
party elsewhere in the system. 
Risk of illicit use is the risk that a payment method may be 
used for illegal purposes, for example, money laundering, 
terrorism financing, or the purchase of illegal goods and 
services such as drugs or child pornography. Similarly, the ease 
with which criminals can launder stolen funds or finance 
terrorists with legitimately earned funds affects not only the 
victims of the crimes that give rise to the “dirty” funds, but 
society as a whole. 
13 Bank for International Settlements (2000).
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3.1 Some Insights from Economic Theory
Risk Containment as a Good
Economic theory offers some useful concepts for under-
standing risk in payments systems. All payments systems are 
systems for managing valuable information: They keep records 
of transactions and communicate transaction data. Any 
information stored and transmitted by a payments system can 
be described as an economic good, an item having value in 
exchange.
Thanks to modern information technology, emerging 
payment methods can offer tremendous efficiency gains over 
traditional methods of making payments. Electronic data can 
be easily stored at a few locations and then shared among 
payments system participants at very low cost. Payment data 
thus meet Varian’s (1998) description of a digital good, a good 
that can be stored and transferred in digital form.
Varian argues that digital goods are different from standard, 
physical goods (such as cornflakes, sneakers, and minivans) in 
that they are nonrival goods. A nonrival good is one whose value 
does not diminish with any one individual’s use or 
consumption of it. A textbook example of a nonrival good is 
broadcast television: One’s consumption of a TV show does 
not diminish the quantity available for consumption by 
another individual. Other examples of digital goods that are 
nonrival goods are recorded music, video, and computer 
software. The data managed by modern payments systems are 
another example of this type of good: The use of a credit card 
in one electronic transaction does not diminish the ability to 
use it in another transaction so long as the credit limit is not 
exceeded. (Credit, cornflakes, and sneakers are not nonrival 
goods; they get used up.)
Central to the value of any digital good is data integrity—
garbled music or video is useless, for example. The usefulness 
of payment data can be diminished by fraud and security 
breaches or by operational disruptions that make it difficult to 
transmit data. Consequently, we argue that the integrity of 
payment data is also a nonrival good. If a payments system 
participant secures a facility against operational disruptions 
and fraud, it creates an environment conducive to smooth 
operation of the payments system, generating benefits for other 
participants as well.
Nonrival goods are classified as club goods or public goods 
according to whether access to the good can be limited. A club 
good is a nonrival good that a group or individual can be 
stopped or excluded from consuming. For example, cable 
television firms exclude nonsubscribers from their service by 
encoding their signals and giving decoders only to paying 
subscribers. A public good is a nonrival good for which access 
cannot be limited. National defense, for example, is a nonrival 
public good because everyone in a country is covered and no 
one can be excluded from the benefits.
In the case of actions to contain fraud and operational risks 
in emerging payments, the club good description is perhaps the 
most appropriate. Successful private sector payment providers 
(for example, credit cards, debit cards, and ATM networks) 
have by and large managed to contain fraud.14 They also 
maintain operating procedures and auditable controls to limit 
operational risk. Participation in these systems is limited by 
membership rules, and participants (individuals, merchants, 
14 Reported fraud rates for credit card transactions are about 5 basis points of 
value, and similar fraud rates are reported for checks (Nilson Report). Industry 
representatives report that actual rates may be a little higher (Green Sheet). 
Visa reports an operational “reliability rate of 99.999 percent” (“Securing 
Payments: Building Robust Global Commerce,” 2005, available at <http://
whitepapers.zdnet.com/whitepaper.aspx?&scname=Bank+Management 
&docid=152783>). 
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Type of Risk Definition
Fraud  Risk of financial loss for one of the parties 
involved in a payment transaction arising from 
wrongful or criminal deception. The risk that a 
transaction cannot be properly completed 
because the payee does not have a legitimate 
claim on the payer.
Operational Risk of financial loss due to various types 
of human or technical errors that disrupt 
the clearing and settlement of a payment 
transaction. The risk that a transaction cannot 
be properly completed due to a defective device 
or process that precludes the completion of all 
the steps required in a transaction.
Legal  Risk that arises if the rights and obligations 
of parties involved in a payment are subject 
to considerable uncertainty.142 Understanding Risk Management in Emerging Retail Payments
banks, and processors) associated with high levels of fraud or 
operational snafus can be expelled.
There are natural limits to the power of exclusion, however. 
Since every payments system is a type of communications 
network, excluding too many network participants lowers the 
network’s value for those parties that remain. There will always 
be a trade-off between security and inclusiveness. 
Why Containing Fraud and Operational 
Risks Is Difficult
Hirshleifer (1983) describes a model of a nonrival good that is 
particularly applicable to data integrity in electronic payments 
systems. He describes the problem of people living in a 
“polder,” a low-lying patch of land protected from flooding by 
a system of dykes. Each resident of the polder is responsible for 
maintaining the portion of the dyke that abuts his or her 
property. The dyke clearly provides a nonrival communal 
good: flood protection for all residents of the polder. 
In this example, the degree of flood protection provided 
depends exclusively on the height of the lowest portion of the 
dyke. In other words, the degree of protection will not be 
determined by the total flood-mitigation efforts of everyone 
living inside the dyke, but rather by the one resident who exerts 
the least effort in maintaining the dyke. The analogy with 
emerging payments is straightforward: The risk mitigation 
effort of each party in the particular payments system to 
maintain data integrity prevents fraudulent data from 
circulating in the system, and a commitment to operational 
excellence allows others in the system to complete their 
transactions effectively.
There are obvious parallels between flood protection in 
Hirshleifer’s polder model and the mitigation of fraud and 
operational risks in payments systems. The 2005 data breach 
at CardSystems Solutions, for example, resulted in problems 
not only for CardSystems, but also for numerous other users 
of card payments systems—cardholders, merchants, banks, 
and processors. A data breach or operational disruption in 
one portion of a payments system can open the metaphorical 
floodgates to problems throughout the entire system. The 
potential for rapid propagation of fraud and operational 
disruptions is the flip side of the efficiency of electronic 
payments.15
Varian (2004) points out some difficulties in the provision 
of such nonrival goods. Because the amount of mitigation 
depends crucially on the participant that exerts the least effort, 
and because different system participants have different 
amounts at stake, there is a significant risk that participatory 
incentives will not be uniform. Participants with a lot at 
stake—that is, those with high net benefits from more 
mitigation activity—will prefer a higher level of protection 
from the risk in question than those with lower net benefits are 
willing to support. However, because overall protection 
depends on the participant that exerts the least effort, the latter 
group determines the overall level of risk mitigation.
The problem of nonuniform risk management incentives 
crops up regularly in payment situations. Various stakeholders 
in payments systems will naturally prefer different levels of 
mitigation in the system. The longer the supply chain or the 
larger the network for a given payment technology, the greater 
is the potential for disagreement about the appropriate level of 
mitigation.
Many different providers of services are integral to the 
processing of electronic payments. These providers include 
encryption firms, processors that route transaction data, and 
Internet service providers, among others. However, because 
minimizing fraud and operational risks requires effort from all 
participants, some mechanism is needed to give all participants 
the right incentives to “maintain the dyke.” Private contracts, 
laws, and regulations can each play a beneficial role in creating 
such incentives.
Confronting Fraud and Operational Risks
Despite the difficulties outlined above, experience has shown 
that all successful payments systems have learned to keep fraud 
and operational risks at fairly low levels. Competition among 
payments systems gives important incentives to service 
providers to mitigate these risks. Systems that fail to contain 
risks do not survive in the payment marketplace.16
Service providers have developed three broad approaches to 
managing various kinds of payment risk: pricing, insurance, 
and containment. 
15 For a formal exposition of this point, see Kahn and Roberds (2005).
16  “Thinking Like a Criminal,” Arizona Republic, August 24, 2006, recounts 
how an entity that tried to compete with PayPal in the mid-1990s was closed 
down by Visa because as many as “three out of five . . . transactions turned out 
to be fraudulent.”
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￿ Pricing means that a party that bears a risk is 
compensated appropriately. Pricing is extremely 
important in allocating credit risk—banks that issue 
credit cards charge higher prices, in the form of higher 
interest rates on borrowing and higher annual fees for 
cards, to subprime cardholders who they believe are less 
likely to pay their balances. Issuing banks willingly bear a 
high level of credit risk on these cards because the higher 
interest earned compensates for the greater risk taken.17 
￿ Insurance is an agreement between two parties as to who 
will bear a loss when one occurs. Thus, for instance, a 
merchant that receives a credit card payment is insured 
against the risk that the cardholder will not be able to 
pay the balance.
￿ Containment is a catchall term for activities that tend to 
deter or suppress risk. In the case of fraud risk, examples 
include swiping a credit card through a card reader to 
verify that the card is valid and asking for extra 
identification.
For fraud risk in particular, the effectiveness of the pricing 
and insurance approaches is limited by factors known as 
adverse selection and moral hazard.18
Adverse selection refers to situations in which undesirable 
outcomes result from asymmetric information among various 
parties to a transaction. Pricing works best to offset risks that 
are known and can be quantified in advance. When the payee 
and payer are anonymous to each other, the payee cannot 
know if the payer poses a bad risk and is likely to make a 
fraudulent payment. Correspondingly, the payer cannot know 
if the payee is selling legitimate goods. Particularly when 
commerce is conducted remotely (for example, over the 
Internet or by telephone), adverse selection undermines 
incentives to play by the rules. “Bad actors” can optimize their 
own malign incentives, undermining the confidence of 
legitimate merchants and consumers.
Moral hazard describes the effect of insurance on the 
incentives and thus behavior of an insured party. The 
availability of insurance can lead to opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the insured at the expense of the insurer. For 
example, a merchant that accepts payments via cards branded 
by a major network like Visa, MasterCard, or American 
Express is insured against credit risk (and sometimes fraud 
risk) and consequently may not have an incentive to make sure 
that a payment is legitimate and within a cardholder’s credit 
limit. The card networks and their issuing banks, which provide 
the insurance, contain the risks by imposing on merchants 
authorization and authentication procedures that create 
appropriate incentives and guard against fraudulent card use.
17 About 4 percent of balances are never paid off.
18 These problems generally plague information security; see Anderson and 
Moore (2006). 
Of course, moral hazard can arise on the payer’s side, too—
for example, when the right of a credit card holder to dispute a 
transaction may tempt the cardholder to claim that fraud was 
committed when it was not. Authentication procedures, 
particularly the collection of signatures at the point of sale, are 
designed to contain this form of moral hazard.
Moral hazard can also lead to opportunistic behavior that 
magnifies operational risk in payments systems. A payment 
processor might fail to spend the resources to maintain 
sufficient backup facilities—in the case of, say, a natural 
disaster knocking out a key data center—because the negative 
consequences of failing to maintain backup data do not accrue 
fully to the processor, but rather to thousands of other 
individuals and businesses as well. Card networks impose 
backup and resiliency standards to offset the lack of private 
incentives and contain this particular risk. 
But pricing and insurance alone are not sufficient risk 
management techniques: Credit card issuers do not seek out 
cardholders who are likely to commit fraud, then attempt to 
recover the costs through differentially higher fees or interest 
rates; ACH operators do not offer two fee schedules, one for 
reliable and another for unreliable originating banks; and 
providers of payment services are generally reluctant to give 
unknown buyers and sellers guarantees against loss.19
Containment Techniques
Containment of fraud and operational risks requires coopera-
tion among payments system participants. All need to have 
incentives to undertake actions that will keep fraud and 
operational risks down to acceptable levels. These incentives 
can be provided by monitoring system participants and then 
imposing penalties for inadequate risk controls that can lead 
to significant losses or disruptions.
Monitoring is the foundation of containment: Checking on 
participants will reveal whether they are engaging in appro-
priate levels of risk mitigation. But monitoring is unlikely to be 
19 Provisions in the Federal Reserve’s Regulations E and Z, which implement 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and the Truth in Lending Act, respectively, 
impose some insurance requirements. 
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effective without some system of penalties for noncompliance. 
Monetary fines serve as deterrents. Contracts and laws assign 
legal liability for failures, which can be costly if breached, while 
some regulations establish performance standards and impose 
penalties when they are not met. Varian’s (2004) theoretical 
analysis of the polder model, described earlier, suggests that 
relatively severe penalties—beyond the economic cost of a 
security lapse—may be necessary to ensure compliance.
Limitations on liability mean that penalties cannot do the 
whole job. In cases of fraud, the party most deserving of 
punishment, the fraudster, is usually long gone by the time the 
fraud is discovered. Even in cases where liability for a fraud or 
operational incident can unambiguously be assigned to a 
known party, there may be no practical level of penalty that 
could cause the guilty party to internalize the consequences 
of its inadequate risk controls. Sometimes the threat of the 
ultimate penalty—exclusion—may be the most effective 
deterrent: Payments system participants that fail to maintain 
adequate operational standards or fraud controls may be 
barred or expelled from the system.
Thus, we have a variety of techniques—pricing, insurance, 
and containment—for creating incentives for participants in 
retail payment transactions to mitigate fraud and operational 
risks. Underlying structural aspects of many electronic retail 
payments—particularly their nonrival nature—and the 
concomitant ability to limit access to the payment networks 
make containment techniques especially useful for creating 
deterrence tools. 
3.2 Special Concerns for Emerging 
Payments Systems
Any viable payments system must find ways to maintain the 
integrity of payment data, but certain concerns are unique to 
emerging payment methods. 
First, there is a “newness factor.” The novelty of emerging 
payment methods implies that various problems may not be 
anticipated and therefore adequate safeguards and procedures 
may not be in place to address them. Emerging methods face a 
learning curve when confronting these issues. As evidenced by 
their survival and success, established payment methods have 
devised ways to mitigate these risks. The key question regarding 
emerging payment methods is whether their providers have the 
incentives and means to overcome the risks that could 
otherwise hinder widespread adoption.
Competition gives important incentives to payment 
method providers to mitigate many of these risks. Users can 
choose from many payment methods, and their choices reflect 
the extent to which the methods best facilitate smooth, low-risk 
transactions. In competition with payment methods less 
susceptible to fraud or operational failures, providers of new 
payment methods have clear incentives to address those risks. 
Failure to do so jeopardizes a method’s viability. As in other 
markets, competition among payment methods is an 
important mechanism to induce providers to address these 
problems.
New payment technologies can improve economic welfare 
by allowing diverse participants—consumers, merchants, 
banks, and nonbank service providers—to exchange payment 
data in ways not previously possible. The value of these 
technologies hinges, of course, on data integrity. Successful 
payments systems will find ways of coordinating the behavior 
of diverse parties to facilitate data exchanges that serve their 
mutual best interests.
Data Integrity and Privacy
Integrity of payment data is important not only as a safeguard 
against fraud and operational interruptions, but also for 
maintaining participants’ privacy. Privacy issues have come to 
the fore in recent months. A group known as the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse reports that more than 165 million records have 
been compromised by data security leaks since February 
2005.20 Such data breaches create potential for fraud, identity 
theft, and general loss of privacy.
Similar to other aspects of payment data integrity, the 
maintenance of participants’ privacy constitutes a nonrival 
good. By preserving the privacy of its legitimate participants, 
a payments system encourages widespread participation and 
enhances the value of the system to all users. But as discussed 
above, nonrivalness can make it difficult to reach agreement 
among payments system participants on the necessary level of 
privacy protection.
20 See <http://www.privacyrights.org/> (accessed September 7, 2007).
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Maintaining privacy is tricky because, by nature, it runs 
counter to the payment function: Every type of payment 
requires the exchange of some information, which under the 
wrong circumstances can be subject to misuse. For a consumer 
to use a credit card to buy something from a merchant, for 
example, he or she must give the credit card information to 
the merchant. The consumer’s surrender of credit card 
information is essentially a compromise between the 
merchant’s need to identify the consumer and the consumer’s 
desire to remain anonymous to prevent misuse of his or her 
personal information. The merchant obtains enough 
information about the consumer to determine that the 
transaction is legitimate, but no more. Under some circum-
stances, maintaining privacy can conflict with the goal of 
preventing fraud, as Stigler (1980) points out. Moreover, 
Katz and Hermalin (2006) discuss efficiency reasons for 
privacy that suggest that the full sharing of private information 
within a payments system could be inefficient, even in the 
presence of fraud risk. Every successful payments system has 
to reach a workable compromise between these two facets 
of transaction privacy. 
Illicit Use
Unlike many risks associated with payments systems, the use 
of a payment method for illicit purposes (such as money 
laundering, financing of terrorism or crime, or the purchase 
of illegal goods) rarely involves direct risk of financial loss to 
a participant in the payment transaction. Thus, unlike many 
operational risks, the use of a payment method for illegal 
activities does not pose a risk as such for other users of that 
payment method. In this case, the payment method works 
as designed, but individuals use the method for nefarious 
purposes external to the payments system itself. Rather than 
creating financial risk to direct participants in a transaction, 
illicit use introduces or carries broader societal risks. Since 
monetary gains are one determinant of the level of criminal 
activity, erecting obstacles and deterrents to these activities 
supports an important public good.
Unfortunately, many of the features that provide value for 
legitimate transactors can also make them susceptible to 
misuse by individuals engaging in money laundering and 
terrorism financing. Features that suggest the potential for a 
payment method to be used or misused for illicit purposes 
include speed of value transfer, transportability, inter-
mediation, anonymity, quantity limits, network connectivity, 
and ease of interface. A common feature of many of these 
methods, especially electronic methods, is the speed with which 
value can be transferred. While the relative speed of the 
transactions is generally a desirable feature in the general 
market—it reduces certain types of fraud—it can also make it 
difficult to identify and preempt illicit transactions.
Similarly, some emerging payment methods involve highly 
transportable stores of value, either in physical or electronic 
form. Diverse participation and a high degree of privacy, both 
of which are features that make a payments system attractive 
for legitimate users, can make it easier to mask illicit use. Some 
emerging payment methods operate with little or no involve-
ment of conventional financial intermediaries such as banks, 
making it difficult for authorities to monitor and identify illicit 
use. Network connectivity addresses the breadth of uses of a 
payment method and may alter its attractiveness as a store of 
value. The interfaces through which transactions are initiated 
may alter the ability to identify illicit transactions. In practice, 
it may be hard to distinguish between “user-friendly” and 
“illicit-user-friendly” platforms.
Like other types of nonrival goods, payments systems can 
guard against illicit use through the use of monitoring and 
penalties (including criminal penalties) and through the 
exclusion of miscreants. But the high degree of similarity 
between the needs of legitimate and illegitimate users of 
payment technologies, as well as the need to balance societal 
costs and benefits, suggests that some amount of criminal use 
and other socially undesirable activity will always slip through. 
Society’s determination of what constitutes an acceptable 
threshold of illicit use is a complex and thorny issue that goes 
beyond the scope of this article.
4. Three Examples of Risk and 
Its Management in Emerging 
Payments
We present three informal case studies to illustrate how 
characteristics of new payment methods affect potential risk, 
how key participants act to mitigate those risks, and how 
participants’ actions demonstrate the economic principles 
described above. The three payment methods are: 1) general-
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purpose prepaid cards, 2) e-check payments through the ACH 
system, and 3) proprietary online balance-transfer systems 
such as PayPal. Each incorporates new technologies, new 
networks, and new rules to create an entirely new payment 
method. These examples are not intended to demonstrate the 
full range of payment options. They are used in different 
venues, employ different means for initiating payments, and 
clear and settle transactions differently; yet they employ similar 
risk mitigation strategies. (The appendix describes our 
selection of the case studies.)
While the payment methods in these case studies are not 
immune to all types of risk, we concentrate on fraud, 
operational, and illicit use risks because emerging methods 
appear particularly susceptible to these problems. The case 
studies focus on those areas of emerging payments that differ 
from established payment types. To the extent that an 
emerging payment is initiated using new technology but clears 
and settles through an established settlement network, our 
discussion examines the new front-end mechanism but 
excludes the clearing and settlement portion. 
4.1 General-Purpose Prepaid Cards
General-purpose prepaid cards, branded by a payment 
network such as Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or 
Discover, can be used by all merchants that accept that network 
brand. Introduced in the 1990s, the cards function similarly to 
credit and debit cards at a point of sale: A customer swipes a 
plastic card through a standard reader, and the transaction is 
authorized and settled through a card network. In addition, 
some cards can be used to withdraw funds from ATMs and to 
make remote purchases or pay bills, similar to debit cards.21 
Cardholders can often check the balances available on their 
cards through a website or telephone response system.
General-purpose prepaid card programs differ in price, 
product functionality, customer identification requirements, 
value limits, and levels of cardholder protection. Their 
distinguishing characteristic is that they require cardholders 
to turn over funds in advance for future purchases of goods 
and services. Frequently, the funds on these cards can be 
reloaded at a variety of outlets, such as at merchants, over the 
Internet, or through ATMs. This feature allows a cardholder 
to use a single card without replacement or interruption, thus 
increasing the card’s value as a potential substitute or 
complement to a formal banking relationship.22
21 Payroll cards are a similar application, but differ dramatically in terms of the 
business model used for marketing and distribution and in terms of regulatory 
coverage. Payroll card programs are not discussed here.
Risk Analysis
The advance-payment feature substantially mitigates credit or 
nonpayment risk in general-purpose prepaid card products, 
allowing such cards to be marketed widely and distributed 
directly to consumers by nonbank third parties, referred to as 
card sponsors. Although every payment card must be issued by 
a bank, a nonbank sponsor’s logo often appears as the most 
prominent brand name on the card. The broad involvement of 
nonbank institutions in the distribution of general-purpose 
prepaid cards stands in contrast to the common practices of 
traditional debit and credit card programs.
Since general-purpose prepaid cards use the credit and debit 
card infrastructure for transactions, clearing, and settlement, 
they share the risks inherent in these more mature financial 
products. These cards also exhibit a number of new risks, 
including a complex supply chain that often involves nonbank 
third parties at vulnerable stages of delivery and an increased 
susceptibility to money laundering and illicit transactions. 
For general-purpose prepaid cards, nonbank institutions 
often stand between the cardholder and the bank that issues the 
card. In many cases, the nonbank institutions maintain the 
primary relationship with the cardholder. This prominent role 
for a third party in initiating and maintaining customer 
relationships can complicate the regulatory treatment of cards 
and introduce credit risk for the bank issuers and, potentially, 
the cardholders. The third-party entities could go bankrupt or 
be subject to various operational failings that would be less 
likely to impact accounts at a supervised and FDIC-insured 
financial institution. The involvement of the major card 
associations and the fraud detection that they bring to bear 
appear to deter illegal activity. News reports recount instances 
of fraud, however, such as using stolen credit cards to purchase 
prepaid cards at a self-serve checkout counter.23
22 See McGrath (2007) for further discussion of the functionality and market 
position of prepaid cards.
23 David Hench, “Savvy Thieves Use Gift-Card Scam to Fool the System,” 
Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram, February 21, 2007. 
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Additionally, third-party nonbanks may not have the same 
level of data security that banks have, potentially exposing 
consumer data to greater risk of theft. In particular, third-party 
distributors may fail to impose uniform data security standards 
for their retailers, a security lapse that increases risks for data 
gathered and stored at the point of sale. 
A downside of the flexibility provided by cards able to 
facilitate nearly anonymous transactions is that they are 
attractive vehicles for abuse by illegal enterprises.24 The Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and Internal Revenue Service–Criminal 
Investigation each allege that prepaid cards are used in bulk 
cash smuggling. They explain that drug dealers load cash onto 
prepaid cards and send them to their drug suppliers outside the 
country who use the cards to withdraw money from a local ATM. 
This potential for illicit use is exacerbated if card issuers or 
sponsors operate offshore because it makes it harder to enforce 
relevant regulatory requirements. In fact, some general-
purpose prepaid card products are openly marketed as a 
convenient way to circumvent law enforcement and tax 
authorities. For example, a prepaid card called the Freedom 
Card used to  promise, among other things, “a fully 
anonymous ATM debit card . . . requiring no phone numbers 
or IDs . . . no daily cash withdrawal or loading limits . . . real-
time card funding with any e-currency, PayPal, Western Union 
or bank wires.”25 The card was originated by an offshore 
financial institution, but it could be used to obtain funds 
throughout the world. This product appears not to exist any 
more.  While such offerings are often short-lived, dubious new 
products emerge regularly.
Mitigation
Efforts are also under way to deal with the illicit use and data 
security risks. An industry task force says it is in the process 
of creating “AML [anti-money laundering] best practices 
guidelines” in response to anticipated regulations from the U.S. 
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network aimed at 
thwarting money laundering and terrorist financing through 
prepaid cards.26 The major card networks have issued 
guidelines to the issuing banks that are intended 
to reduce the attractiveness of prepaid cards for money 
24 See Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working Group (2005), Financial 
Action Task Force (2006), and Sienkiewicz (2007).
25 See <http://www.freedom-cards.com> (accessed mid-2006).  
26 See <http://www.cardassociation.org> for information on Network Branded 
Prepaid Card Association efforts.
laundering.27 These include capping the stored dollar amount 
per card, limiting the frequency with which and the value of 
funds that can be reloaded, obtaining and confirming certain 
customer data prior to approving card applications, and 
providing liability protection for consumers in the event of 
card loss or fraudulent usage. 
The operational and fraud risks of general-purpose prepaid 
cards are evidenced by: 1) a more complicated supply chain for 
providing the cards, often involving nonbank third parties in 
primary customer relationships, and 2) the potential for illicit 
transfer of funds. Domestic and international law enforcement 
officials are particularly interested in mitigating the latter risk. 
4.2 ACH e-Checks 
Over the last decade, the National Automated Clearing House 
Association (NACHA), which sets rules for ACH transactions, 
has gradually developed rules and formats for six new 
electronic debit transactions, referred to as e-checks. These 
e-checks allow banks and their clients to convert checks or 
information from checks into ACH debits.28 The following 
discussion describes two types of e-check transactions—
accounts-receivable conversion (ARC) and telephone-initiated 
(TEL) transactions—to illustrate the risk factors and 
mitigation trade-offs associated with these new transaction 
types. 
ARC rules permit businesses to transform checks mailed by 
bill-paying consumers into ACH debits. In the fourth quarter 
of 2006, the 613 million ARC transactions initiated accounted 
27 As reported in Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working Group (2005).
28 NACHA members include financial institutions and regional clearinghouse 
associations. NACHA manages the development, administration, and 
governance of the ACH system.  Its rules provide more than fifteen worktype 
codes for different types of payments—such as corporate-to-corporate 
payments, recurring payments, point-of-sale payments, and e-check 
payments—as a means to identify specific rules, formats, and uses. Historically, 
the ACH has typically been used for direct deposit of payroll and Social Security 
payments and to collect recurring monthly mortgage, insurance, student loan, 
and business-to-business payments. For more information, see <http://
www.nacha.org/About/default.htm>. 
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for more than half of e-check volume. Use grew by about 
one-third over the prior year: Roughly 6 percent of checks 
written are now being converted to electronic debits under 
ARC rules.29 
TEL transactions are debits to consumers’ accounts 
authorized by the account holder via telephone to a merchant, 
vendor, or service provider. These transactions make one-time 
ACH payments available when written authorizations are not 
feasible.30 The 76 million TEL transactions processed during 
the fourth quarter of 2006 reflect a 16 percent increase over the 
previous year. TEL transactions account for about 7 percent of 
e-check volume. 
ACH transactions that fail to clear (because of, for example, 
insufficient funds, errors in processing, or suspected fraud) 
are returned along with a code indicating the reason for the 
return. Return rates are useful indicators of risk because 
the standardized return reason codes indicate what type of 
problem caused the clearing failure. Typically, high levels of 
29 Bank for International Settlements (2006, p. 157) reports that 33.1 billion 
checks were paid in 2005. ARC transactions are written as checks but paid as 
electronic debits. 
30 NACHA rules restrict TEL transactions to prevent their use for “cold-call” 
telemarketing, but they can be used when there is a preexisting relationship 
between merchant and consumer or when the consumer initiates the call.
specific return codes indicate high levels of specific risks. 
For example, various processing-problem codes identify 
administrative returns that can indicate operational problems, 
whereas returns of transactions not authorized by an account 
holder (known as unauthorized transactions) can indicate 
fraud problems. 
The chart presents historical rates for ARC and TEL for the 
types of returns most likely to suggest administrative or fraud 
problems. It also shows parallel return rates for preauthorized 
payments and deposits (called PPD), which is the most widely 
used recurring, non-e-check debit transaction and serves as a 
useful comparison. 
There are similarities and differences in the records of ARC 
and TEL returns. In the fourth quarter of 2002, ARC return 
rates for both unauthorized and administrative returns were 
similar to those for PPD debits, but by the fourth quarter of 
2006 they had fallen below the rates for PPD debits. In the 
fourth quarter of 2002, TEL return rates were some six to eight 
times the rates for PPD debits, and although they have since 
fallen, TEL return rates remain at least twice those for PPD 
debits. Overall, ARC and TEL each had high return rates in 
their introductory periods and the rates declined over time. 
ARC return rates today are very low, whereas those for TEL 
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Risk Analysis
ARC and TEL transactions share some risks with other ACH 
debit transactions, but differ in risks that are driven by the 
location at which the payments are initiated and the relation-
ships among the parties to each transaction.31 For ARC, retail 
lockbox processors convert checks sent by consumers to billers. 
Lockbox staff use high-speed equipment to capture coded 
information from the remittance slips and checks. The lockbox 
business is highly concentrated, mature, and controlled. In 
many cases, these processors operate as subcontractors to the 
originating banks, supporting the banks’ cash management 
product offerings. In contrast, TEL transactions rely on 
customer input of account information via telephone, a 
context in which the data and customer’s identity cannot easily 
be verified.
For ARC, the largest risk is operational. ARC rules initially 
made business checks ineligible for conversion to an ACH 
debit. Early problems included inadvertent conversion of 
business checks, particularly those that are the same size as 
consumer checks. Banks on which these checks were drawn 
often returned the transaction.32 Another early problem was 
that processors could not properly match the ARC payment to 
the appropriate checking account: During a pilot program, one 
bank reported its associated administrative returns were as 
high as 10 percent.33
For TEL transactions, fraud is a larger risk, perhaps 
augmented by operational risk caused by various participants 
in its supply chain. TEL is designed for ad hoc transactions 
between merchants and consumers, some of whom do not have 
a preexisting relationship. A long-standing business 
relationship is thus often absent, which increases the likelihood 
of either seller or buyer fraud. Adding to this risk is the fact that 
TEL opened the ACH network to new merchants and 
31 Shared infrastructure and processes can contribute to risks in certain ACH 
payments. The ACH network does not use real-time authentication and 
authorization, and there are no centralized databases of originators accused of 
fraudulent use of the ACH system. These are mitigation techniques used by 
other payment networks.
32 Daniel Wolfe, “Dealing with the Accidental Conversions,” American Banker, 
December 8, 2004. 
33 Steve Bills, “Pilot Done, Wells to Widen Lockbox Conversion Effort,” 
American Banker, October 18, 2002. 
businesses, including some telemarketers and bill collectors, 
that may not have received sufficient scrutiny or monitoring 
from the banks through which they originate their 
transactions. Inadequately researched bank relationships can 
undermine the “gatekeeper” function in this payment method, 
making it difficult to deny dishonest originators access to the 
ACH network. Use of third-party service providers for TEL can 
compound the difficulty of identifying illegitimate initiators by 
adding an intermediary between the payment-originating bank 
and its ACH debit-originating clients. 
Mitigation
Many of NACHA’s rules and procedures aim to control and 
mitigate these risks. NACHA defines the rights and 
responsibilities of ACH participants, including originators 
(merchants, lockbox operators, and other businesses that 
initiate ACH payments) and originating banks (banks that 
provide ACH services to originators). Originators are required 
to follow NACHA rules and procedures when preparing and 
submitting ACH payments. Originating banks warrant certain 
aspects of ACH transactions and are financially liable for 
returned transactions. To help control this liability, originating 
banks typically use contract language to shift risk to 
originators. Originators are thus given financial incentives to 
correct and avoid processing problems. 
When the problem arose of business checks being converted 
inappropriately, ARC originators reconfigured processing 
equipment to improve separation of business checks and 
worked to change NACHA rules to permit conversion of the 
business checks that were hardest to identify.34 Originators also 
reduced administrative returns by building databases to match 
ARC payments and checking accounts.35 NACHA requires a 
lockbox processor or its bank to keep check images for two 
years, but to destroy the physical check within fourteen days. 
Such measures help mitigate fraud risk and simultaneously 
decrease the risk of processing a check twice. 
NACHA rules also require originating banks to gather 
sufficient information to understand the background and 
business of any new originator that may be given access to ACH 
services. This gatekeeping function generally keeps dishonest 
originators out of the ACH network, but it proved inadequate 
for TEL transactions. As illustrated by the Assail example 
34 Daniel Wolfe, “Dealing with the Accidental Conversions,” American Banker, 
December 8, 2004. Note that effective September 15, 2006, business checks that 
do not carry an indicator in the auxiliary on-us field of the MICR line can be 
converted to ACH debits.
35 Steve Bills, “Pilot Done, Wells to Widen Lockbox Conversion Effort,” 
American Banker, October 18, 2002.
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described earlier, telemarketing was one source of fraud that 
resulted in high return rates for TEL transactions. 
As evidence of problems with TEL transactions mounted, 
NACHA intervened directly with originating banks and 
outside of its normal processes. NACHA and its member banks 
identified the specific TEL originators responsible for initiating 
many of the transactions that were subsequently returned, and 
these originators were shut down.36 
Various participants in the ACH system have taken steps 
to improve the effectiveness of originating banks as 
gatekeepers. These steps include the introduction of NACHA 
rules requiring originating banks to screen and monitor 
originators and to execute the appropriate contracts.37 
Additionally, in June 2003, NACHA instituted a monitoring 
process to flag originators with TEL returns exceeding 2.5 per- 
cent. Outside of the NACHA framework, ACH operators have 
introduced risk monitoring services and rule changes, and 
federal regulatory agencies increased the attention given to 
these transactions in their guidelines on controlling risk in 
retail payments.38 These actions were followed by a rapid 
decline in returns, suggesting that monitoring, enforcing 
rules, and limiting access to the ACH network have been 
successful strategies for risk mitigation. 
Although these mitigation efforts reduced TEL return rates, 
the return rates remain higher than NACHA would like. Thus, 
NACHA is pursuing additional proposals to make monitoring 
return items and resolving problems more effective. To address 
risk issues beyond those of TEL more broadly, NACHA also 
reorganized its risk management infrastructure, creating a Risk 
Management Advisory Group to help implement a new risk 
management framework.39 Subsidiary work groups are 
attempting to address three areas of risk mitigation: 1) control 
of access to the ACH system, 2) the monitoring and control 
environment, and 3) enforcement activity. Additionally, to 
increase the visibility of risk management at ACH originating 
banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a 
guidance document in September 2006 requiring that key ACH 
statistics be reported to banks’ boards of directors and senior 
officials.40 
36 Wells Fargo, “Waging War on ACH Fraud,” <http://www.nacha.org/
ACHNetwork/ACH_Quality/WellsFargo_DB.doc> (accessed January 12, 2007).
37 This includes establishing limits on ACH transactions and on return items, 
conducting audits, and making ad hoc contact to verify that the originator has 
represented its business appropriately in terms of the products it is marketing, 
its financial strength, and so on. 
38 For information on Reserve Bank services, see <http://frbservices.org/Retail/
fedachRisk.html>. For information on Electronic Payments Network services, 
see <http://www.epaynetwork.com/cms/services/processing/value/
001477.php>. See also Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(2004, pp. 43-4).
39 See NACHA Risk Management Newsletter 2, no. 2, pp. 1-2 (2006).
4.3 Proprietary Online Balance-Transfer 
Systems 
Among the payment options that arose for Internet commerce 
are proprietary online schemes to transfer balances of funds 
between accounts. In this type of scheme, customers establish 
an account with a service provider, such as PayPal, and use 
e-mail messages to initiate payments.41 If both parties to a 
payment have accounts with the same service provider, the 
service provider simply transfers monetary balances between 
their accounts. At PayPal, most customers are buyers and 
sellers (small businesses and individuals) involved in online 
transactions, usually at an auction site. The service is also used 
by small online companies and by individual customers who 
value the ability to transfer funds from person to person. 
Neteller, a similar service provider, is widely used for payments 
to online gaming sites.42 Other online person-to-person 
payment providers that follow a proprietary balance-transfer 
or similar model include GreenZap, StormPay, and eGold.43 
We call these providers proprietary online balance-transfer 
systems.
PayPal, the largest and most well-known online payment 
service provider, uses the proprietary online balance-transfer 
approach and intermediated almost $23 billion in transactions 
during the first half of 2007. PayPal is larger and more 
sophisticated than any of its competitors. eBay, the huge online 
auction business, acquired PayPal in 2002, and eBay 
40 See OCC Bulletin no. 2006-39, “Automated Clearing House Activities: Risk 
Management Guidance,” available at <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/
2006-39.pdf>.
41 This discussion is our interpretation based on information from public 
sources; it is not based on conversations with anyone at PayPal. For detailed 
descriptions of PayPal’s processes, see Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003) 
and Kuttner and McAndrews (2001).
42 Neteller describes “the online gaming industry” as its “main market” 
(“President and CEO’s Report for the Six Month Period Ended 30 June 2006,” 
available at <http://investors.neteller.com/neteller/upload/
1NLRInterims2006releaseFINAL11sep062.pdf>). As of early 2007, Neteller, 
based in the United Kingdom, did not permit U.S.-based customers to make 
gambling payments. See <http://content.neteller.com/content/en/
member_businessupdate.htm> (accessed February 2007).
43 Companies that have tried but failed to provide online services for consumer- 
to-consumer and consumer-to-business payments include Citibank, Yahoo!, 
and eBay, with their respective products C2it, PayDirect, and BillPoint.
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transactions currently generate almost 70 percent of PayPal’s 
dollar volume. 
These service providers act as agents by accepting deposits 
from customers and allowing money to be transferred from 
one in-house account to another. Although specific 
arrangements vary, in-house account balances typically are 
funded from a bank account by ACH transfer or a buyer’s/
sender’s credit or signature debit card. Frequently, funds can 
be withdrawn by check or by co-branded debit/ATM card, 
transferred to the user’s individual bank account by ACH 
credit, or used for future transfers within the network.
Risk Analysis
Although the volume of activity suggests that this type of 
payment meets a market demand for rapid online payments, 
it remains an emerging payment method accompanied by a 
variety of risks. Examples of fraud, operational, and illicit use 
risks include: 1) fraud associated with simple enrollment and 
anonymity; 2) operational errors and malicious attacks, such as 
“phishing” and “pharming”;44 3) operational risk associated 
with technological complexity and a complex supply chain; 
and 4) susceptibility to illicit use. Specific rules, processes, 
controls, and screening capabilities vary across providers, 
yielding different levels of unmitigated risk and affecting the 
availability of mitigation options.
The core philosophy of the proprietary online balance-
transfer model is to permit easy, quick entry and 24-hour 
availability. Under this system, an unknown, possibly 
anonymous, seller can be positioned to perpetrate fraud or 
simply fail to live up to his or her side of a transaction. Such a 
dishonest seller could take the money and not ship the product. 
The buyer would then have to try to recover funds under the 
rules of the payment provider’s user agreement or protection 
policy. To be covered under PayPal’s Buyer Protection Policy, 
the seller must enroll in the verification program and the buyer 
must comply with other eligibility requirements.45 In contrast, 
the user agreement for GreenZap, a smaller but similar service 
provider, indicates that it is not liable for any purchases or 
services and does not issue refunds for a product or service if 
44 Phishing employs social engineering and technical subterfuge to generate 
“spoofed” e-mails that appear to be from a legitimate company. It uses the 
company’s logo and style to lead consumers to counterfeit websites designed to 
trick them into divulging private data such as account user names and 
passwords. In contrast, a pharming attack redirects visitors from a legitimate 
website to an unofficial location by exploiting technical and procedural 
security weaknesses that compromise the domain-name server.
45 Ralph F. Wilson, “Assessing Criticism of PayPal,” Web Commerce Today, 
March 15, 2002. Available at <http://www.wilsonweb.com/wct5/
paypal_assess.htm>. 
the seller does not fulfill on commitments. GreenZap also states 
that members send funds to third parties at their own risk.46
Online businesses are also vulnerable to the risk of outages, 
and businesses with high visibility seem to be most attractive to 
those seeking to disrupt services and overcome security 
features. The size of PayPal (about 133 million accounts as 
of year-end 2006) and the speed at which technical changes 
are made to support its growth have, indeed, led to some 
significant system downtime and made PayPal subject to 
hacker attacks.47 In addition, in October 2004, a site redesign 
crippled some of its operations, leaving the website unavailable 
for two days and subject to intermittent outages for several days 
thereafter.48 Moreover, PayPal and eBay were the top phishing 
targets in 2005, representing 62 percent of all attacks, according 
to Netcraft, a company that tracks and blocks phishing sites.49 
Proprietary online balance-transfer payment methods 
depend on complex, multistep processes. For the user, the tasks 
are kept simple. Behind the scenes, however, many parties 
(including individuals, merchants, third-party service 
providers, the buyer’s and seller’s banks, and the ACH, debit 
card, and credit card networks) are involved in completing a 
transaction. As is the case generally in complex networks, the 
large number of digital “hands” and handoffs increases the 
difficulty of identifying and assessing risk severity and the 
exposures that can vary by user, channel, or product. 
Intentional user anonymity makes these services susceptible 
to illicit use, such as money laundering or payments for illicit 
purposes. Only the service provider has information about user 
identities. While this structure protects users from fraud and 
46 GreenZap claimed 777,600 users at year-end 2006. See <http://
www.greenzap.com/newz/Company_Update_Q3_Q4_2007.pdf>. See also 
the GreenZap User Agreement, available at <www.greenzap.com>.
47 eBay, Inc., “eBay Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2006 
Financial Results,” press release, January 24, 2007. PayPal does not disclose 
how many of the accounts are active or have been used recently.
48 Jim Wagner, “PayPal Scrambling to Fix Site Glitch,” Internetnews.com, 
October 13, 2004. Available at <http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/
article.php/3421031>.
49 Sean Michael Kerner, “eBay, PayPal Rank High on Phish Lists,” Ecommerce, 
January 6, 2006.
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identity theft, it can also make it easier for users to transfer 
funds illegally because traditional enforcement authorities do 
not have identifying information. In addition, theft of 
identities outside of the network could provide criminals with 
sufficient information to set up false accounts that can be used 
for illegal funds transfers. Further, if a service provider allows 
international transfers, the payment process might be used to 
launder funds between domestic and offshore accounts. 
Mitigation
As the leading service provider, PayPal has an incentive to 
invest in good risk management tools and oversight to protect 
its payment method. Its risk management, in turn, protects 
legitimate users and establishes standards for other online 
payment service providers. The following examples illustrate 
that PayPal, in conjunction with eBay, appears to have learned 
from its losses and risk exposures, creating systems, 
technologies, and rules that help control the risks that emerged 
in its early years. As a result of its efforts, PayPal says that its loss 
rate is four-tenths of 1 percent, well below that of the credit 
card industry.50 
To combat machine-based attacks, PayPal developed an 
account creation process that requires manual human input, 
which has blocked unmanned computer “bots” from opening 
accounts. It also created multiple levels of service, in which 
higher levels of account service require additional identity 
confirmation. The verified member program, for example, 
protects PayPal and creates a product it markets to customers. 
PayPal also retains the right to terminate service to any 
participant it suspects of not complying with its rules.51 
In addition, PayPal developed background computer 
monitoring programs (named Igor and Ilya) to search for 
transaction patterns consistent with suspicious buyer or seller 
50 Computer World, “Q&A: PayPal Fights Back Against Phishing,” February 12, 
2007.
51 PayPal’s user agreements can be accessed at <http://www.paypal.com/
cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/ua-outside>. 
behavior. While these efforts have not totally eliminated fraud, 
they appear to have had some success: Statistics reported in the 
press show that merchants using PayPal have loss rates due to 
fraud that are noticeably below the e-commerce average.52 
To prevent the risk of a data breach, PayPal says that it 
collects, encrypts, and stores sensitive customer information 
on servers not connected to the Internet. Additionally, to 
counter phishing and pharming, PayPal provides clear 
instructions on what to do if customers suspect they have 
received a phishing e-mail. When notified of a phishing attack, 
PayPal attempts to close down the perpetrator’s site within 
twenty-four hours.53 
PayPal limits its own risk inherent in its complex supply 
chain by specifying its own rights and responsibilities as well as 
those of its users in cases where errors, disruptions, or 
unauthorized transactions occur. The user agreement is 
complex, and it is updated as needed.  Information on how 
PayPal establishes contracts or manages relationships with its 
suppliers is not publicly available. 
Online payment service providers have addressed the risk of 
illicit use and international exposure by placing limits on 
transfers and account balances for unverified accounts.54 
PayPal relaxes these limits for its verified accounts, but the 
verification process exposes would-be criminals. As a result, 
PayPal may have become less useful for money laundering. It 
does appear possible, however, to launder large sums of money 
by sending small increments to many accounts using a mass-
pay type of function.55 To counter the above risks, eBay and 
PayPal have established a joint fraud investigation team to 
track down problem transactions and users. Moreover, within 
the context of its legal obligations, PayPal has a strong history 
of cooperating with law enforcement agencies.56 
Ultimately, the proprietary online balance-transfer model is 
a self-contained, closed payment method, albeit one open to a 
wide range of potential participants. All payment account 
activity occurs within a single entity, which can make it easier 
for a service provider to internalize and control risks. By 
operating as a closed system, a service provider can manage 
52 Paul Cox, “PayPal and FBI Team Up,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2001; 
Ralph F. Wilson, “Assessing Criticism of PayPal,” Web Commerce Today, 
March 15, 2002; Rob Garver, “eBay and Banking: Is PayPal a Serious Rival?” 
American Banker, November 15, 2005.
53 Similarly, Neteller’s annual report describes significant expansion in its 
fraud, security, and IT capabilities. See <http://investors.neteller.com/neteller/
upload/1AR2005_0406.pdf>. 
54 See, for example, <http://www.PayPal.com>.
55 The mass-pay feature allows PayPal Premier or business account holders to 
pay up to 10,000 recipients in varying amounts at one time.
56 See Paul Cox, “PayPal and FBI Team Up,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2001. 
Also see Dawn Kawamoto, “PayPal Charged with Breaking Patriot Act,” CNET 
News.com, March 31, 2003.
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fraud by denying or restricting access to users who do not meet 
its membership eligibility requirements or who fail to provide 
the required authentication. It can temporarily or permanently 
block users who do not comply with its rules or who are 
suspected of fraudulent or unauthorized activities. PayPal’s 
experiences illustrate that a provider must aggressively battle 
new operational and fraud threats with vigilant monitoring 
of payment transactions.
5. Lessons Learned
The foregoing case studies offer many useful lessons for 
managing the problems that arise in emerging payment 
methods. Although each case is unique, there are common 
themes, which can be organized into three basic lessons. 
5.1 Recognize the Problem
The very features that contribute to the efficiency of new 
payment forms—their scalability, speed, and relative 
anonymity—can also enable the rapid proliferation of various 
types of payment risk. As information moves more easily 
among payments system participants, more intensive 
management is needed to safeguard this data flow. Moreover, 
the more widespread and successful the system becomes, the 
bigger the potential for disruptions.
The incident reported earlier concerning two Russian men 
scamming PayPal offers a striking illustration of this principle. 
The perpetrators first breached the security arrangements at 
Internet service providers, gaining an initial cover of 
anonymity. They then used electronic means to create 
anonymous e-mail accounts, which in turn were used to create 
bogus accounts at PayPal. The speed and extent to which this 
was possible relied fundamentally on computers and the 
Internet.
To date, most innovative payment methods still have 
relatively low volumes of transactions. So even if risks are 
not well controlled, the overall risk of loss is limited.57 
Complacency, however, would be irresponsible. Significant 
flaws or fraud risks to ACH products have the potential to 
reach more institutions and individuals than most emerging 
payment products. And, as demonstrated by the Assail, 
57 The volume and value of e-money payment transactions in the United States 
are negligible. In contrast, ACH e-check transactions grew more than 40 per-
cent last year, totaling about 2 billion transactions for the first half of 2006. 
See Bank for International Settlements (2006, Tables 7 and 8 and pp. 145-6).
CardSystems, and TJX incidents, even interruptions of low-
value payments can result in large losses and disruption of 
business for many participants.
5.2 Maintain a Perimeter
All legitimate payments system participants—consumers, 
merchants, banks, and other service providers—share a 
common interest in risk mitigation. The nonrival nature of risk 
mitigation means that all these participants operate behind the 
same common protective perimeter of security and reliability. 
Successful payment methods find ways to encourage an 
appropriate buy-in of all participants in terms of contributing 
to this shared resource. As the case studies illustrate, 
wrongdoers need to be kept outside this perimeter—even in 
the most inclusive payment methods.
PayPal offers a good illustration of this principle. A key 
aspect of PayPal’s market positioning is its openness, 
inclusiveness, and ease of use. It claims that all anyone needs to 
participate in PayPal is an e-mail address. However, as PayPal 
has become more sophisticated and has placed increased value 
on avoiding fraud and operational losses, it has accordingly 
tightened its perimeter and imposed participation standards. 
Today, PayPal screens each participant, requiring not only an 
e-mail address but also some identifying information as well as 
credit card, debit card, or bank account information (all of 
which can be independently verified) before a participant is 
permitted to send funds.
Telephone-initiated ACH transactions offer another 
example of adaptation to new risks. The highly decentralized 
nature of the ACH, in which debit transactions are created by a 
wide variety of entities, has facilitated a relatively high fraud 
rate in the case of TEL transactions. Recent and proposed 
changes to NACHA rules are meant to encourage buy-in from 
banks in controlling this problem. They do so by imposing 
monitoring of problematic originators and, under some 
proposed rules, penalties for violators. This process is 
necessarily more complicated than it is in a proprietary system 
such as PayPal, given the diverse composition of the ACH. Yet 
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there now seems to be widespread acceptance of the idea that 
stringent rules—such as exclusion—are required to keep fraud 
rates down to manageable levels.58
Prepaid cards are something of an intermediate case, being 
neither purely proprietary like PayPal nor as decentralized as 
the ACH. On the one hand, anyone can purchase a prepaid 
card at a retail outlet and anyone, not necessarily the same 
individual, can make a purchase with the card at a participating 
retailer. On the other hand, the card association whose name is 
on the card (for example, MasterCard or Visa) screens issuing 
banks and binds them contractually to particular provisions. 
The card associations also screen the card-selling merchants for 
a variety of risks, including the effectiveness of their security to 
prevent large-scale theft. Finally, the card associations impose 
contractual and monitoring provisions on merchants that 
accept their cards.59
For prepaid cards, the card associations serve as enforcers to 
ensure the integrity of the network, for example, by minimizing 
operational and fraud risks. Thus far, this control appears 
to be effective, even though the nominal issuers of general-
purpose prepaid cards—merchants and various third parties—
are neither typical card issuers nor regulated financial 
institutions. In a broader context, the aftermath of the May 
2005 data breach at CardSystems illustrates the efficacy of such 
control:60 Visa and American Express subsequently barred 
CardSystems from participating in their networks, forcing the 
firm out of business.61
The CardSystems case also highlights the difficulties posed 
by lengthening supply chains in the payment industry. Again, 
tensions can arise between efficiency and security. Speciali-
58 NACHA has recently approved a code of conduct that establishes standards 
of behavior and “specifies NACHA’s right to disassociate itself from any 
organization that, in NACHA’s opinion, fails to meet the standards and 
principles stated in the code” (emphasis added). See Elliott C. McEntee, 
“Open Letter,” NACHA, April 13, 2006.
59 See, for example, BankInfoSecurity.com, “Visa Takes Aim at Data 
Companies,” August 8, 2006.
60 See Perry (2005).  
61 CardSystems was purchased by Pay by Touch for its merchant network, 
according to a company press release dated October 15, 2005.
zation along the payment supply chain represents a source of 
efficiency, but the heavy involvement of nonbank or third-
party participants means that the defensive perimeter for data 
integrity cannot be monitored by the banking system alone.
Historically, the role of third-party processors was limited 
to back-office services, such as lockboxes. In conjunction with 
emerging payment methods, some third-party entities have 
moved into the more prominent position of maintaining 
primary relationships with customers. Conversely, in some 
cases, banks have moved from maintaining primary relation-
ships to becoming back-office service providers. This role 
reversal for bank and nonbank institutions has raised policy 
concerns and is a topic that warrants additional study.62
5.3 Trust the Marketplace—but Not Blindly
Producing a nonrival good is always a difficult and often a 
controversial business. Computer software, recorded music, 
and video, three common examples, are frequent objects of 
public controversy, regulation, and litigation. But somehow, 
the market finds innovative ways to provide these goods 
fairly—though rarely without growing pains along the way.
Electronic payment services also demonstrate both market-
driven discipline and creativity, including for their security and 
reliability components. New payment products are 
immediately subjected to the forces of a market’s “invisible 
hand,” including ramifications of exposure to operational, 
fraud, and data security risks. As a result, operators are forced 
to learn about previously undetected operational problems. 
Outages of almost any sort can rapidly undermine user 
confidence in the reliability of a product, a particular service 
provider, or a new form of payment generally. New products 
also seem to attract the attention of fraudsters eager to exploit 
flaws before they are rectified. Only if a payment provider can 
address such problems quickly and effectively can it stay in 
business. Thus, for many of these risks, market mechanisms 
provide significant incentives for service providers to see that 
they are addressed promptly and thoroughly.
New products in their early stages repeatedly show 
patterns of operational or fraud problems and unmitigated 
risk, after which containment efforts follow. When PayPal 
faced fraud losses early on, it took steps to reduce those losses. 
It also implemented new authentication techniques and 
introduced innovative technology. PayPal continues to revise 
62 Concerns about the role of nonbank third parties in the payments system 
have been raised, but they remain unresolved. See, for instance, Hoenig (2000) 
and Sullivan (2007).
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its contracts and participation agreements to increase 
controls and limit risk.
Some providers of similar online payment services have 
failed, at least in part because of fraud losses, and others have 
run into trouble with law enforcement authorities over illicit 
payments.63 The service providers that survive are those that 
are able to identify and mitigate losses quickly. When NACHA 
introduced the TEL product in 2001 and return rates began to 
soar, it took steps to identify the source of the problems. As a 
result, return rates fell to more acceptable levels. The WEB 
transaction, another recently created ACH e-check application 
useful for Internet transactions, had a return rate of 0.68 per-
cent in 2002, but it fell to 0.08 percent in 2004.64
As payments systems grow and flourish, however, so too 
does the potential for disruption. Recent developments in the 
payment card industry provide an illustration. Card networks, 
historically quite vigilant in the protection of their data 
integrity, have nonetheless been subject to significant data 
breaches. Increasing volume and a more diffuse supply chain 
have posed new difficulties. The card networks have responded 
by putting more pressure on merchants to comply with data 
security standards, but this effort remains a work in progress.65
The vitality of the market for payment services does not rule 
out a role for public policy. Well-designed regulations can help 
coordinate industry efforts and maintain industry standards. 
Laws and criminal penalties can serve as deterrents to activities 
such as fraud. In addition, the importance of confidence in the 
overall payments system—a public good—should not be 
underestimated. Policymakers will always have an interest in 
ensuring that disruptions in one method of payment, however 
unlikely, do not spill over into other segments of the payments 
system.
In contrast to other risks considered here, the steps needed 
to reduce the risk of illicit use are not always fully supported by 
63 See, for example, Neteller Lawrence Complaint: United States of America v. 
Stephen Eric Lawrence, Southern District of New York. January 16, 2007, 
available at <http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article.cfm?contentID= 
163591>. Also see Neteller Lefebvre Complaint: United States of America v. 
John David Lefebvre, Southern District of New York, January 16, 2007, available 
at <http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article.cfm?contentID=163594>.
64 Furst and Nolle (2005, p. 37). 
65 Robin Sidel, “Credit Firms Push to Thwart Fraud: Merchants Face a Penalty 
If Steps Aren’t Taken to Curb Identity Theft; Visa Misses Own Security 
Deadline,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2006.
general market incentives. The federal government and many 
states respond to this risk by enacting laws and regulations to 
prohibit the use of payment methods for such purposes and by 
creating incentives for payment providers to screen out 
prohibited transactions. A measured policy response again 
seems appropriate, as the risk of illicit use must be balanced 
against the costs of compliance.
6. Conclusion
Innovative payment mechanisms, such as the ones described in 
this article, are making transactions less expensive and easier, 
while opening new commercial venues for payment 
transactions. As with more established forms of payment, 
however, the ultimate success of these inventive arrangements 
will depend on their ability to control risk.
For retail payments, the predominant risks are operational, 
fraud, illicit use, and data security risks. Providers mitigate 
these risks through techniques such as pricing, insurance, and 
containment. In the growing market of electronic transactions, 
these techniques have shared value that does not decline with 
additional use and can be enhanced with additional 
contributions—in other words, they are nonrival. 
This article examined three emerging payment methods to 
draw some lessons from their operation and markets. The 
payment methods explored here carry transactions that are 
relatively low in value, and, during their start-up phases, most 
had a small number of users. However, some ACH-based 
transactions quickly reached substantial volume levels. With 
low values and generally limited breadth, the payment methods 
do not currently pose systemic risks or demonstrate substantial 
policy gaps. We note, however, that the risks discussed here are 
not confined to emerging payments.
All payment processes have risks that must be controlled. 
Fraudsters seem especially drawn to new technologies, 
becoming early adopters in their attempts to exploit any 
identifiable weaknesses. But fraudsters can also perpetrate 
innovative attacks against established systems. Moreover, even 
low-value retail payment providers can be the targets of 
machine-based attacks that can cause substantial damage; the 
speed of corruption and potential for proliferation of 
damaging problems are certainly shared by all payment 
methods that use electronic and networked technologies.
An important lesson to be taken from this study of emerging 
payment methods and their risks is that the products, services, 
rules, and technologies are all changing—and doing so at what 
appears to be an accelerating rate. So, too, are the tools for 
perpetrating fraud and data breaches as well as the techniques 
for mitigating them. This study provides a new structure for 
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considering risk and mitigation strategies that can be used to 
analyze new as well as established payment methods.
Our analysis of the risk mitigation techniques used by 
payments system providers concludes that containment is the 
dominant means of controlling risk. Generally, market 
mechanisms appear to encourage providers to mitigate risks 
appropriately: Most private-sector providers have the tools to 
manage many of these risks, particularly because they treat the 
integrity of the network as a club good; in other words, they 
retain the option to exclude any party that fails to comply with 
the network’s safeguards. The applicability of this approach 
to the risk of illicit use, however, appears less certain.
More cooperative, open systems, which derive some of 
their utility from their universality, have less ability to exclude 
particular users and thus face greater risk mitigation 
challenges. Nonetheless, the problems, risks, and gaps in 
processes can be addressed only if the providers and 
participants remain vigilant while applying the lessons we 
described.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2008 157
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In general, new payment methods are built on top of existing 
products. Enhancements, significant innovations, and various 
levels of rule changes are added to these products to address 
newly identified market opportunities or to take advantage of 
expanding technological capabilities. To identify the extent to 
which a payment method is new rather than more established, 
we grouped the components of a generic payment process into 
two broad categories: the access channel and the payment 
method.a An access channel is used at the beginning of the 
transaction process; it provides the user interface or front end 
(for example, a plastic card with a magnetic stripe) and may or 
may not include verification of the identity of the involved 
parties and validation of the payment instrument. The payment 
method includes the remaining parts of the payment process 
governed by applicable laws, regulations, and contracts. 
These various factors—new versus established components 
of access channels and payment methods—can be organized 
into a 2 x 2 matrix, as shown in Exhibit 1. Payment methods 
that have the fewest changes from established methods fit 
into the upper-left quadrant, although rule changes or new 
combinations of established characteristics can yield a new 
payment method. The lower-right quadrant includes emerging 
payment methods that incorporate the greatest number of new 
characteristics in terms of both access channels and payment 
methods. The remaining two quadrants, upper right and lower 
left, are hybrids of new and established components.
Exhibit 2 provides examples of payments that might be found 
in each of these four cells. For the case studies, we selected one 
payment method from each quadrant (shaded). 
￿ ACH payments initiated via telephone (TEL) fall in the 
upper-left quadrant, since neither the telephone access 
channel nor the ACH clearing and settlement portions 
are new. 
￿ General-purpose prepaid cards use established card-
swipe technology to create a new payment and therefore 
fall in the upper-right quadrant. 
￿ Accounts-receivable conversion (ARC) uses the new 
access channel of scanning technology and software to 
read paper checks and create transactions that flow over 
the established ACH network, as represented in the lower-
left quadrant.  
￿ Proprietary balance-transfer systems meld a new access 
technology—the Internet—with new transaction 
methods—e-mail and balance transfers—and therefore 
fall into the lower-right quadrant. 
The TEL and ARC payments are types of ACH e-checks that 
share a clearing and settlement network and many rules (these 
are addressed jointly in the analysis above).
a See Bank for International Settlements (2000) for a description of the 
components of payment processes.
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